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Rhodesian Impasse. U.S. Counts on Split Among Guerrillas

By BERNARD GWERTZMAN

Special to The New York Times

LONDON, April 18—In the aftermath of his inconclusive African trip, Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance is pinning American hopes in southern Africa on somehow enticing Joshua Nkomo, the more flexible of the two Rhodesian guerrilla leaders, to join in a negotiated settlement with the Salisbury Government even if Robert Mugabe, the other guerrilla leader, refuses.

News

Analysis

American officials aboard Mr. Vance's plane said on the overnight flight from Rhodesia that such a policy posed risks with no certainty of success. But it helps explain why Mr. Vance and his fellow mediator, Foreign Secretary David Owen of Britain, seem so intent on keeping even the flicker of interest in negotiations alive.

Once either the Patriotic Front, as the guerrilla alliance is known, or the Salisbury group absolutely rules out talks with the other, Mr. Nkomo and his Zambia-based guerrilla force will find it more difficult to break away from Mr. Mugabe, the more militant of the two.

This emerging strategy of seeking to split the guerrilla alliance was in the minds of American and British policymakers even before Mr. Vance and Dr. Owen embarked on their latest five-day mission.

Vance Found Mugabe Adamant

As the result of two days of negotiations last weekend with the guerrilla leaders in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, Mr. Vance now seems convinced that Mr. Mugabe will reject any compromise in which the Salisbury Government of Ian D. Smith and his three black colleagues would have a fair chance of winning a free election.

Mr. Nkomo, a burly man and an experienced politician, impressed Henry A. Kissinger two years ago as the man most likely to become Rhodesia's first black prime minister. He also impressed Mr. Vance last weekend with his willingness to seek a reasonable solution.

Mr. Vance's view of Mr. Mugabe was shared by Dr. Owen, who resented the personal attacks Mr. Mugabe leveled against him in the discussions.

Andrew Young, the American representative at the United Nations, who has had more experience in dealing with Africans than Mr. Vance, is less critical of Mr. Mugabe and believes that a settlement would be impossible without Mr. Mugabe's participation.

Reporters on Mr. Vance's plane were told of an incident that underscored the difference between the guerrilla leaders in their discussion with the mediator: the question was raised about a general amnesty in a new Rhodesian government.

Mr. Mugabe began by saying there should be no amnesty for "war criminals" such as Mr. Smith and his white associates. But he was cut off by Mr. Nkomo, who said an effort should be found to forget the past and look to the future.

Vance to Attend CENOT Talks

Mr. Vance spent the day in London resting and preparing for a meeting of the Central Treaty Organization, a mutual defense alliance of Britain, Iran, Pakistan and Turkey, in which the United States also participates. Tomorrow he will fly to Moscow for talks on the ne-

gotiations for a new treaty uniting strategic areas.

His trip to southern Africa was his first to that part of the world, and in a sense it was an educational one because he seems to have been personally affected by the people he met.

For instance, in addition to appearing to be more hopeful about Mr. Nkomo than about Mr. Mugabe, Mr. Vance seems to have been struck by the determination of Mr. Smith and his black associates—Bishop Abel Muzorewa, the Rev. Ndabingi Sithole, and Senator Jeremiah Chirau—to succeed in their own arrangements for black majority rule by next year. Moreover, Mr. Vance seems to have been impressed by Mr. Smith's seriousness and his leadership qualities.

On the other hand, Mr. Vance had the impression that the black members of the Salisbury group were less willing to welcome Mr. Nkomo or Mr. Mugabe into negotiations because of a desire to keep black power for themselves.

New Meeting Was Urged by Nyerere

The Vance-Owen mission had its origins in a request from President Julius K. Nyerere of Tanzania and other African leaders for a new meeting with the guerrilla chiefs. The previous round of talks in Malta in January had not made much progress. The African leaders told the United States and Britain that the guerrilla alliance had been prevailed upon to attend a meeting of all the parties in the Rhodesian dispute if one was called and, more importantly, to accept the basic elements of the British-American plan for an impartial Rhodesian transition government and free elections.

In the actual discussions the mediators found the guerrilla leaders less conciliatory than Mr. Nyerere had promised. This raised the question whether the African supporters of the guerrilla alliance had misled the mediators or had themselves been misled.

American officials tend to believe that Mr. Nyerere and his colleagues had not bothered to press Mr. Nkomo and Mr. Mugabe on details and that the African leaders were embarrassed when Mr. Mugabe, in particular, took a hard position demanding that the guerrillas' Patriotic Front dominate the police and a new governing council.

The American hope is that since the Patriotic Front is pledged to attend a conference of all parties, the Salisbury group will be reluctant to appear less forthcoming and will in the end agree to attend also.

Deal Based on Nkomo's Self-Interest

Then, the reasoning goes, under the cover of a general discussion, Mr. Nkomo might make a deal with the Salisbury group to accept elements of the British-American plan and to negotiate their differences, thereby forcing Mr. Mugabe to fight a guerrilla war with his forces alone or to join in the settlement, too.

But this scenario is based on an assumption that Mr. Nkomo would be willing to break with Mr. Mugabe and that the Salisbury group will show more flexibility toward the guerrillas than it has up to now. Mr. Nkomo in the past has proven an able politician and probably will decide what to do on the basis of what he regards as his self-interest.

But, for Mr. Nkomo to decide that it serves his interests to strike a deal, the Salisbury Government will probably have to be perceived as having enough domestic and international support to make its internal settlement plan successful.

This, in turn, requires the United States and Britain to avoid giving the impression of outright hostility to Salisbury. It also requires that Washington and London not appear to be on the side of the Salisbury group, for that would lend credence to the skepticism in much of Africa that in the end the British and Americans will support racism.

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Soviet General Who Lost Citizenship Asks Asylum

By ARNOLD H. LUBASCH

Pvotr G. Grigorenko, a retired general and prominent dissident in the Soviet Union, formally requested political asylum in the United States yesterday.

General Grigorenko, a smiling 70-year-old man wearing a brown suit with a striped tie, explained at a news conference in New York that he was seeking asylum because the Soviet Government had stripped him of his citizenship. He said he had been charged with damaging Soviet prestige with his open criticism of the regime.

The general gave his request to Maurice F. Kiley, the district director of the Immigration and Naturalization Service in Manhattan. Mr. Kiley said he would interview the general and evaluate the case, then decide on the request.

Hope for Eventual Return

At his news conference, held next to Mr. Kiley's office, General Grigorenko said he had been deprived of his Soviet citizenship two months ago while visiting the United States on a six-month visa.

His wife, Zinaida, and a son, Oleg, accompanied him to the United States, the general said. He said he had come to this country for a prostate operation and to visit another son, Andrei, who is an

electrical engineer and permanent resident of Long Island City.

General Grigorenko, a wounded and decorated officer in World War II, said he hoped to return to the Soviet Union someday because "it is my fatherland, my friends, my fellow citizens and my earth, which I love."

The general spoke softly and with obvious emotion in his native Ukrainian. His words were translated by Lydia U. Savoyka, a counselor with the Migration and Refugee Services of the United States Catholic Conference.

Describing himself as "a man without a country," General Grigorenko said, "It is my right to live in my fatherland." He said he did not believe that the present Soviet Government would "last forever."

In 1961, he denounced "lingering

Stalinism" and began his repeated criticism of the suppression of human rights in the Soviet Union. He was subsequently arrested, deprived of his rank as a major general and confined in psychiatric hospitals for more than six years.

General Grigorenko said he has been speaking to industrial organizations and other groups in the United States, where his visa as a private visitor will expire at the end of next month unless he receives asylum.

Spain Stiffening Airport Security

MADRID, April 18 (Reuters)—Spain has bought security equipment worth \$2.5 million to check air passengers and their luggage, Transport Ministry officials said today. The equipment will be installed at 11 airports, including Madrid's.

Intrigue

Furtive Meetings, Surveillance Led to Espionage Indictments

By Christopher Dickey
Washington Post Staff Writer

Almost exactly a year ago a Vietnamese woman code-named "Keyseat" by her superiors at the FBI and CIA arrived in Paris carrying a flight bag filled with at least 49 classified U.S. State Department documents.

Two days later she turned the documents over to representatives of the Hanoi government, who thought she was working as a spy for them.

The Vietnamese in Paris were interested in the documents because they were just about to start talks with the Carter administration about U.S.-Vietnamese relations. The war had been over for two years, the Vietnamese were cooperating in the identification of remains of Americans missing in action, and they expected the United States to support their admission to the United Nations. The mood was hopeful.

But throughout April, May and June of 1977, as the diplomatic negotiations in Paris held the attention of the press, another quite secret drama involving the

Americans and the Vietnamese was being played out on the streets of Washington.

Furtive meetings in a Dupont Circle cafeteria, a suburban shopping mall and the home of a well-known Vietnamese expatriate in Washington soon would come to the attention of President Carter and the highest officials of his administration.

Because of the way they chose to investigate what they believed to be a serious case of espionage, important constitutional questions have been raised, Attorney General Griffin Bell went to court to defend his actions and considerable attention has been focused on a trial, which is scheduled to begin May 1 in federal court in Alexandria. It will be one of the very few espionage cases to be tried in recent years and the only one to grow out of this nation's long involvement with Vietnam.

The attorney general first learned of the case the day after the opening round of talks in Paris was over, when he received urgent phone calls from Deputy Secretary of State Warren Chris-

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Furtive Meetings, Surveillance Led to Espionage Charges

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topher and FBI Director Clarence Kelley.

They arranged a meeting for the next day, where Bell was told of an FBI operation called "Magie Dragon," a counterintelligence investigation of Vietnamese antiwar activist David Truong whose father ran as a peace candidate against Vietnamese President Thieu in 1967 and subsequently was jailed. Truong was known among antiwar legislators on Capitol Hill as a respected source of information about what was "really" going on in Vietnam during the war.

"Magie Dragon," Bell was told, had uncovered "one of the worst leaks in State Department history."

The attorney general said in court recently that he was asked during that April meeting to help find out just who was taking the documents, and exactly where they were coming from. He said he was told they might endanger the lives of foreign embassy personnel in Hanoi who had supplied the United States with information.

Bell said he was not shown the documents during the meeting, and according to an FBI affidavit it was not known at the time how many were classified—how secret they were or were not—because whoever had taken them removed such information.

But Bell said recently he was impressed with the gravity of the situation as Christopher and the FBI presented it. "I thought in my own limited way," he said, "that something had been done wrong to our country."

He was asked, he said, to "prevent and detect" the leaks. And one way to do it, he was told, was to authorize a warrantless wiretap on Truong's telephone.

It was Friday, May 6, and the attorney general was getting ready for a leisurely weekend in Louisville for the Kentucky Derby. He had been, for some time, in the middle of several complicated problems that would be complicated even more by such a case.

"When I became attorney general, he said in court, "I didn't know the attorney general engaged in counterintelligence activities."

Since taking office, however, he discovered he was not only involved, but often on the defensive caught up in the conflict between the duty to protect the nation from espionage and

the people's Fourth Amendment right to privacy.

The debate over a president's "inherent power" to authorize searches and wiretaps without a court order, raised during Watergate, still raged in the headlines.

Even as the Carter administration was unveiling legislation to require secret warrants in such cases a retired FBI agent in New York was indicted for illegal wiretaps and burglaries conducted in 1972. (The investigation of that case would eventually lead to riots in the Justice Department and the indictment of former acting FBI director L. Patrick Gray III.)

Bell decided to go to Louisville for the weekend. But on the day he came back to Washington he used the "inherent power" delegated to him by the president to authorize a tap on Truong's telephone.

Bell also decided to pay a personal visit to the president to discuss the case. "Keyseat" would be coming back soon with a letter to Truong from a Vietnamese official in Paris, and Bell got the president to authorize its opening.

"I applaud your business plans," it said, according to an FBI translation, but it warned that "very often there are efforts to swindle and deceive one another."

According to court records the wiretap on Truong's phone went into operation on May 11 and ran continuously until after he was arrested. In all, more than 550 conversations were recorded, dealing with everything from "Star Wars" to the subtleties of Vietnamese cooking.

But within two days after the tape started rolling—on May 13 at 6:53 p.m.—the FBI had essentially what it wanted: Truong was overheard asking someone named Ron to stop by his apartment, and when a pale, baldish man arrived there a little after 10 that night the FBI was watching.

When the man came out of the gray building on F Street about an hour later, an FBI agent followed him. He walked through the wide, dark streets near George Washington University and past the World Bank to the United States Information Agency building a few blocks away.

The agent watched as the elevator indicator in the USA lobby counted its way up to the seventh floor. The agent then checked the sign-in register where he found the name: "R. Humphrey."

Soon, Bell was asked for another

authorization—to place, without a court warrant, a listening device in Truong's apartment, in case there were secrets being discussed there, after carefully going over the methods that would be used to plant it. Bell approved the microphone.

After May 27, every sound made in Truong's apartment was overheard by the FBI.

Finally the president authorized television surveillance in the USA office thought to be the source of the leaks. From June 15 until the end of the summer every move made there was observed, according to court testimony, by two video lenses peering down from the ceiling.

The object of their attention was Ronald Louis Humphrey—later to be indicted as Truong's codefendant. But at the time, according to his lawyers, he was mostly preoccupied with efforts to get his Vietnamese common-law wife and stepchildren out of Vietnam, where they had been "trapped" since the fall of Saigon.

Humphrey secured their release just a month after the FBI told the attorney general that federal agents had found the man who could be taking the documents—classified cables, many of which Humphrey had access to a night "watch officer" in the USA communications room.

After the FBI began to concentrate its investigation on Humphrey, the question became, Bell said, how to stop the leaks.

According to FBI agents there are a number of different ways to handle such a case.

An alleged spy might have been put in a position where access to classified material was limited.

Or a suspected spy might be "doubled"—ruined to work for

United States counterintelligence. (Humphrey's lawyer says that Humphrey did cooperate in the investigation of an alleged Russian agent late in 1976.)

These or similar measures, if they had been possible, would have gone relatively unnoticed. Another way to proceed, however, was criminal prosecution, and during the summer of 1977, though there were many obstacles and objections, that is the course Bell decided to take.

The Supreme Court has never ruled on the use of warrantless electronic surveillance in a foreign intelligence investigation, and the District of Columbia's U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals has questioned its legality.

Federal courts in Virginia, however, generally have expressed fewer reservations on such issues.

On June 22 "Keyseat" arranged to meet Truong at the Landmark Shopping Center in Alexandria, according to her testimony in court. She said she didn't want to go too far from her home in Springfield—where she was making preparations for a move to London—and in any case she was afraid to drive around Washington at night.

Truong borrowed a car to get there, and as three FBI agents took pictures from a distance he gave "Keyseat" a grocery bag full of papers, the court was told.

Inside the bag, according to court records, were 33 more State Department documents, 28 of them clearly labeled confidential, and one Defense Intelligence Agency paper marked "secret," according to government inventories.

It is some of these documents that the government used as a basis for the present indictment of Truong and Humphrey. The reason, according to prosecutors, was to make sure the case would be tried in Virginia.

Regardless of where it came to court, however, Bell knew that he could not make an espionage case against Truong or Humphrey without revealing the contents of some or all of the documents involved.

Because of her intimate involvement with the investigation, he also felt he would have to have the testimony of "Keyseat."

Her civilian name is Dung Krall. Her father is a former Vietnamese ambassador to the Soviet Union, but for more than a decade she has been married to an American who recently identified himself as a naval intelligence officer.

Over the summer, as Bell sought to get the release of the documents and the court testimony of "Keyseat," one prosecutor has said he met with "tremendous opposition" from within the State Department and the National Security Council. The CIA, meanwhile, was not about to give up its agent.

Early one August afternoon, Bell drove out to Langley to talk with CIA Director Stansfield Turner about "Keyseat." Soon afterward her FBI and CIA case officers flew to London to talk to her about testifying.

She said she would think about it. Meanwhile, however, Vietnamese-American relations had begun to worsen.

Though the United States agreed to back Vietnam's admission as a full member of the United Nations after the negotiating sessions in May and June, and there was talk of exchanging diplomatic missions, the question of money Hanoi said it was promised in 1973 to "heal the wounds of war" remained unresolved. The Vietnamese insisted on it, and the United States refused to budge.

About the same time as the December talks in Paris, the State De-

partment gave the "necessary approval" for prosecution of Truong and Humphrey, according to an affidavit signed by Bell.

During the last week of January 1978, after the government agreed to pay \$11,000 for her relocation and protection, in addition to her monthly fee of \$1,200, Keyseat agreed to testify.

Jan. 31, Truong and Humphrey were arrested and charged with crimes of espionage that could put them in jail for three lifetimes.

The indictment named Vietnamese Embassy officials in Paris, and Dinh Ba Thi, the Vietnamese ambassador to the United Nations, as unindicted co-conspirators. Within days Thi was ordered out of the country—a move that had never before been taken against a U.N. ambassador.

To further complicate matters at the State Department, nearly 20 foreign nations had to be told that the same documents Truong and Humphrey are accused of stealing—which allegedly compromise foreign embassy personnel in Hanoi—may be made public during the trial, and in most cases were knowingly handed over to the Vietnamese by "Keyseat."

The day Truong was arrested, FBI agents fanned out across the country to interrogate people who had been overheard on his telephone, were his close friends, or who might have information pertinent to the case.

At the Justice Department there is a story about Bell's mood on the day of the arrests.

People who were at a staff breakfast that morning now say they cannot remember exactly what was said. "These things are very informal, you know," one told a reporter.

But the story that made the rounds has Bell walking into the breakfast in a great humor. "Today, boys," he is supposed to have told them, "we're going to catch us a real spy."

Soviet U.N. Official Is Reported To Have Met U.S. Agents in Past

By ANTHONY MARRO

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, April 17—Arkady N. Shevchenko, the high-ranking Soviet United Nations official who refused to return home last week, had been in contact with intelligence officers of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Central Intelligence Agency for several years, according to a former intelligence officer familiar with the matter.

The officer would not elaborate on the precise nature of the contact, but said that it had involved "some degree of cooperation on the part of Mr. Shevchenko and had been more than a series of informal, casual contacts.

In addition, it was learned from a knowledgeable Government source that, as reported in the current issue of Time magazine, Mr. Shevchenko has offered to provide, for a reported \$100,000 a year, information about whether a man who has cooperated with the F.B.I. in the past is a source of legitimate information or "disinformation" planted by Soviet intelligence agents.

Not Sought Political Asylum

Mr. Shevchenko, the Under Secretary General for the Department of Political and Security Council Affairs and the highest ranking Soviet citizen at the United Nations Secretariat, refused a request from Moscow to return home but has not formally sought political asylum in the United States nor has he resigned his post at the United Nations.

Spokesmen for the F.B.I., the C.I.A. and the State Department all refused today to comment on the report in Time, which said that Mr. Shevchenko had been talking secretly with United States intelligence officers for two years before his defection.

One source familiar with the situation, however, said that there was no question that contacts had taken place in the past, and also that Mr. Shevchenko had suggested recently that he could provide important information about a person the F.B.I. believes has been a reliable source of information in the past.

This person, who is known by the code name "Fedora," has been regarded by the F.B.I. as a "deep plant" who has provided valuable information in the past.

Others in the intelligence community, however, have in the past voiced skepticism about "Fedora," and have suggested that he in fact might be a double agent, intentionally planting false information with the F.B.I. at behalf of the Soviet intelligence agency, the K.G.B.

Although Government sources would not officially comment on this today, a person familiar with the situation agreed that Mr. Shevchenko had suggested that he could provide information about whether "Fedora" was a valuable asset to the F.B.I. or, in fact, a K.G.B. plant.

Ernest A. Gross, a lawyer who represents Mr. Shevchenko, said tonight that he was in no position to comment on the allegations because "they are completely outside of the scope of my knowledge and responsibility."

He said that any comment on the matter would have to come from the State Department.

Tom Reston, a State Department spokesman, said, "We do not comment on intelligence matters." Herbert Hetu, a spokesman for the C.I.A., said, "I just don't have anything to say about that."

One source familiar with the matter said that there was some question in the minds of persons in the intelligence community whether Mr. Shevchenko in fact could provide accurate information about "Fedora."

By KATHLEEN TELTSCHE

Special to The New York Times

UNITED NATIONS, N.Y., April 17—The Soviet official here who refused a week ago to return to Moscow did so again last night.

The official, Under Secretary General Arkady N. Shevchenko, rejected a renewed request made by a high-ranking Soviet official at a meeting requested by Soviet authorities, according to Ernest A. Gross, the American attorney retained by Mr. Shevchenko.

Mr. Gross said the face-to-face talk was held in his Wall Street law office, the same meeting place used a week earlier when Soviet officials first tried and failed to induce Mr. Shevchenko to return home.

Mr. Shevchenko, who has again dropped from sight, has said only that he had "differences" with his Government and has not resigned his position as the highest-ranking Soviet citizen on the United Nations staff. Mr. Gross has insisted Mr. Shevchenko is not "in hid-

ing" but only wants to avoid the clamor for interviews until he can talk to Secretary General Kurt Waldheim about his future.

Family Not in Jeopardy

Mr. Gross said that Mr. Shevchenko was assured last night that his family, which is in the Soviet Union, was not in jeopardy.

Meanwhile, he remains on leave from the United Nations. Mr. Shevchenko signed a new two-year contract Feb. 3. The Soviet Union wrote to Mr. Waldheim approving the extension of the appointment, which is normally held by a Soviet citizen. There is still no clear explanation of why Moscow decided to call him home and why he refused to go. A letter touching on his reasons was sent to Mr. Waldheim but only one or two of the Secretary General's aides have seen the it.

Mr. Gross would not identify the high-ranking Soviet official who attended the meeting, but it was believed that Oleg A. Troyanovsky, the chief Soviet delegate here, had requested the session as he had the first one. Mr. Gross and an observer from the State Department were at both meetings.

Appealed for Reconsideration

In the course of the talk, Mr. Gross said, the Soviet official appealed to Mr. Shevchenko to reconsider his decision, according to Mr. Gross, the Soviet official also "tried to find out what it was that bothered him."

Mr. Shevchenko, Mr. Gross said, "made it clear that he was acting freely and entirely on his own without external restraints or coercion of any kind," adding that his client had reaffirmed his decision against going back.

Although these points were also made at the first meeting with Mr. Troyanovsky, the Soviet delegation here issued a statement asserting Mr. Shevchenko had been forced and was being held by American intelligence agents. The State Department issued a prompt but low-keyed denial of the accusation.

India's Aid to CIA on Listening Post Told Got Information in '60s on Missile Developments, Officials Says

BY SHARON ROSENHAUSE
Times Staff Writer

NEW DELHI—India cooperated with the Central Intelligence Agency in the mid-60s to secure information about "missile developments" from a Himalayan mountain peak, Prime Minister Morarji Desai told Parliament Monday.

Although he never used the word spying or identified the People's Republic of China as the target of the Indo-American plutonium-powered monitoring device installed on Nanda Devi, there was little doubt here about Desai's meaning.

Reading a four-page statement, Desai said that in 1964 India and the United States decided at the "highest level" to cooperate on the listening device powered by plutonium 238.

He cited the "international situation; prevailing at that time," apparently referring to China's 1964 explosion of a nuclear device, only two years after China had humiliated India in a border dispute.

Desai's remarks represented the first official Indian government response to the article in the American magazine Outside, which exposed the CIA operation.

"After the news reports appeared a few days ago," Desai said, "We have assembled relevant details and background of these expeditions with reference to available record and in consultation with both the U.S. government and the Indian departments who were involved in this project."

A spokesman for U.S. Ambassador Robert F. Goheen, who met India's foreign secretary here Sunday, said that there would be no comment and that the U.S. Embassy would "rest on the prime minister's statement."

Desai's comments, in fact, contradicted several points in the Outside article written by Howard Kohn. The article has caused concern here over

the suggestion that the abandoned monitoring device could contaminate the Ganges River, which is sacred to India's dominant Hindu religious group.

"I see no cause for alarm on grounds of health or environmental hazards," Desai maintained although he also proposed that a committee of scientists "assess the problem."

The article claimed the CIA carried out the mission with Indian operatives while keeping the project secret from the government of the Prime Minister Indira Gandhi.

Desai said the Indo-American cooperation began in 1964 but he was not specific on the date. Mrs. Gandhi did not come to power until early 1966, when the spying project apparently continued.

Jawaharlal Nehru, India's first prime minister and Mrs. Gandhi's father, died in office in May, 1964. He was succeeded by Lal Bahadur Shastri, who died in January, 1966.

Desai's statement did not refer to any head of government by name, but he talked of authorities at the highest level.

The first expedition to Nanda Devi, in India's northern frontier near the Chinese border, was made by Indian mountaineers.

An Indo-American expedition followed, Desai explained, and was "scientifically equipped with the device with a view to installing it at a height of 25,000 feet." 645 feet short of the Nanda Devi summit.

A blizzard forced the climbers to retreat. Desai said, "In the precipitate descent under very trying and exacting conditions, they had to leave the power-pack securely cached."

There was no effort to locate and retrieve the device in the winter. Desai said another expedition was mounted the next spring. Desai said that this was in May, 1966, when Mrs. Gandhi was in office. The climbers

found that a major avalanche had occurred and that they could not find the device.

Desai said that searches on the ground and by helicopter continued until late 1968 "but without the equipment being sighted or detected by scientific means."

A new device was taken to the same area in 1967 and installed on a neighboring peak, Desai said. "This functioned normally for a while but was removed subsequently in 1968 and the equipment was returned to the United States."

He did not explain why the device was removed.

The operations were under "joint auspices" and the predominantly Indian personnel, Desai emphasized, had the "approval at the highest political level" of Indian government.

The feared danger from the plutonium-powered monitoring device was that the radioactive material might have leaked into the Himalayan snow and then entered the Indian river system through headwaters of the Ganges.

Desai said water samples were taken up to 1970, "but no trace of contamination was detected."

He pointed out that tests carried out by the United States indicated that even under "extremely unlikely conditions of complete instantaneous fuel exposure to water, there is little, if any, possibility of pollution attaining unsafe."

"We understand that even in such an unlikely eventuality, a flow of 5,000 gallons per day would itself dilute the dissolved material to safe drinking water levels. It is also believed by scientists that the dangers of pollution on instantaneous exposure to air are also minimal."

The device likely was powered by a radioisotope thermal generator or RTG, which is a compact, low-power device. Several were planted on the moon by Apollo astronauts.

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An RTG consists of a small encapsulated slug of plutonium 238, which generates heat for electric power as it decays to rather less harmful uranium. Any device that could be carried up a mountainside would have to be too light to be powered by a nuclear reactor, which could present a far greater radiation hazard in the event of an accident.

Desai reminded the members of Parliament that India entered the joint effort at a time when the nation faced a "critical situation" in what the 82-year-old prime minister called days of "concern, apprehension and anxiety."

ATLANTA CONSTITUTION
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New Direction

THE NEW direction which Admiral Stansfield Turner is charting for the Central Intelligence Agency is fascinating—as long as it is kept within proper bounds.

As director of the CIA Turner is taking the position that the intelligence which is generated should not necessarily be kept secret. Rather, it should be shared with the public. And he cited as an example that economic and political information gathered by the CIA could be useful to American businessmen.

That approach has a good ring to it. There's no question that a great deal of information which flows into the CIA would be beneficial to more than the military and diplomatic community. And it is logical that not all information should be kept in a highly classified state.

But the sticky part is delineating between what should be kept classified and what should be made public. The past CIA policy of keeping everything secret made it relatively easy to handle. There was no danger of the wrong information being passed around.

And it is elementary that any infor-

mation which is made public will be public in a global sense rather than kept within the boundaries of the United States.

Thus those entrusted with deciding what should be public and what should remain secret must be carefully selected and their work carefully monitored. If that is done with the best interests of national security in mind, the Turner approach shows promise.

But as a postscript we do wish to correct one statement the CIA director is quoted as having made. He said that the traditional human CIA agent is needed "to know what someone's plans and intentions are."

It is basic in military intelligence that there is no way of knowing—with any certainty—what someone's intentions are. You can learn his plans. You can determine his capabilities. And from those capabilities you can project what courses of action he is likely to attempt.

But unless you can delve into the human brain you have no way of ascertaining someone's intentions.

We just thought we'd correct the director of the CIA—if he really said that.

Note

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